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For many years, economists have argued that agricultural and
economic policies in developing countries discriminate against
the agricultural sector [Lipton (1977), Schultz (1978)]. In more
recent literature on agricultural protection, authors have
increasingly focused on the measurement of this discrimination
[Peterson (1979), Byerlee/Sain (1986), Krueger/Schiff/ Valdes
(1988)]. Quantitative results suggest that it is mainly the
agricultural export sector which suffers from agricultural and
economic policies. Moreover, the indirect effects from non-
agricultural policies seem to dominate the direct effects from
agricultural policies in many developing countries [Schiff
(1988), Krueger/Schiff/Valdes (1988)].
Often, the incentives for export agriculture are distorted in-
directly by import-substitution policies for the manufacturing
sector. The incidence effect of import protection in the manu-
facturing sector on agricultural exports is expressed by the
concept of true protection. This concept starts from the basic
theoretical work by Dornbusch (1974) . It was extended by Sjaastad
(1980) and applied to the agricultural export sectors of Colombia
[Garcia (1981)], Zaire [Tshibaka (1986)], Nigeria [Oyejide
(1986)], Mauritius [Greenaway/Milner (1986)], the Philippines
[Bautista (1987) and Zimbabwe (Mlambo (1989)]. Until now, true
protection analyses have concentrated on single countries rather
than on making a comparison across countries. A comparative study
is interesting, however, since agricultural export sectors have
developed very differently in various countries. The question
arises whether the differential performance is due to a different
incidence effect of non-agricultural import protection on agri-
cultural exports or to different levels of nominal protection. In
order to answer this question, it is the objective of this paper
to measure, compare and analyze the true protection of agricul-
tural exports in two countries - Peru and Malaysia. In these
countries, the agricultural export sectors have developed very
differently.- 2 -
The paper is organized as follows. The concept of true protection
will be reviewed briefly in section 2. In section 3.1, a survey
of import protection in the manufacturing sectors of Peru and
Malaysia will be given and the differential performance of the
agricultural export sectors will be outlined. In sections 3.2 and
3.3, econometric results will be presented which show the inci-
dence of import protection in Peru and Malaysia. On the basis of
the quantitative results, the question will be answered whether
the differential taxation of the agricultural export sectors is
due to a differential incidence of non-agricultural import pro-
tection or to a different magnitude of protection levels in the
manufactured and the agricultural sectors. The total taxation of
agricultural exports, arising from agricultural and non-agri-
cultural policies, is calculated and compared for both countries.
Finally, major results are summarized and policy conclusions are
drawn.
2. The Concept of True Protection; Analytical Framework
The appropriate framework for analyzing the economywide reper-
cussions of trade policies is provided by Dornbusch's (1974)
general equilibrium model for an open economy which produces and
consumes three types of final goods: exportables (X), importables
(M) and non-traded goods (N). Since the economy is assumed to be
a price taker on international markets, the domestic prices of
*
traded goods (PM, Pv) are determined by world market prices (PM,











PX/PN = (E/PN)P* (1+s) . (2)
Since our primary interest is on tariffs, we will assume s to be
zero. Thus, the domestic relative prices between importables and
exportables (P) in a tariff-ridden economy are linked to world
market prices by- 3 -
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px is the world market price ratio and T=(l+t) is
the tariff wedge. The exchange rate and the price of non-
tradeables cancel out.
Equation (3) implies that the domestic prices of importables
relative to exportables are fully determined by world terms of
trade and any tariff wedge. The imposition of an import tariff
initially raises the domestic nominal price of importables rela-
tive to both exportables [equation (3)] and home goods [equation
(1)] by the amount of the tariff. However, this change in rela-
tive prices induces consumers to shift demand away from import-
ables to home goods and exportables. It also provides incentives
to increase domestic production of import substitutes. As a re-
sult, resources are diverted from home goods and exportables. In
the sector producing home goods, the resulting excess demand
places upward pressure on prices until they reach a new home-
goods market equilibrium. These adjustments finally lead to a new
equilibrium position for the economy where
i) the domestic price of importables relative to the price of
exportables has increased by the full amount of the tariff,
because the country cannot influence its foreign terms of
trade;
ii) the domestic price of importables relative to the price of
home goods has increased, but by less than the full amount
of the tariff because the nominal price of home goods has
also risen somewhat;
iii) the domestic price of exportables has fallen relative to
both the price of home goods and that of importables.
Hence, although the tariff has to be paid by importers, the ulti-
mate price changes are such that part of the tariff is "shifted"
on to the producers of exportables as an implicit tax borne in
the form of diminished real income. The change in the price of
exportables relative to home goods thus measures the extent of- 4 -
the "true discrimination" of exportables. The greater the rela-
tive rise of the home-goods price, the larger the true discri-
mination of exportables. The rest of the ultimate burden falls on
producers of home goods the price of whose products has fallen
relative to importables. The extent of this decline determines
the magnitude of the implicit subsidy to domestic producers of
importables given by an import tax. It measures the "true pro-
tection" accorded to domestic import-substituting activities. The
greater the relative fall of home goods the larger the true
protection [Greenaway/Milner (1987, pp. 203 et seq.)]. Hence, the
true protection concept emphasizes the "incidence" of trade
policy measures.
These relationships can be formalized within the framework of the
three-sector model of Dornbusch (1974) in which general equili-
brium is implied by either the trade-account equilibrium or
equilibrium in the home-goods market. Equilibrium in the home-

















After differentiating and rearranging the market equilibrium
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In this expression, n • and e.. represent the demand and supply
elasticities for home goods with respect to the prices of
importables and exportables. " denotes a proportional change in a
variable. Equation (7) can be expressed as:- 5 -
Y (p _p)+Y (P - P ) = 0 (8)
where YM = nM - eM and YX - nx - ex
are the elasticities of the excess demand for home goods with
respect to the relative price of importables and exportables.








For a small open economy, the world terms of trade are exoge-
nously fixed, so that trade policy fully determines the relative
price of tradeables. Assuming P* to be constant, it follows that
(p _p\ = (p _ p ) + T
Introducing equation (10) into (8) , the incidence effect of the
tariff on the exportable sector is given by ,•
Px - PN = -o)T (11)
where u = YM/(YM + Yx)
is the incidence parameter which determines the extent of the
shifting of the tax burden onto exportables. As shown by equation
(11) , the effects of a tariff will depend on the substitution
possibilities between home goods and traded goods. This result is
not surprising, since it is a basic principle of public finance
that the incidence of a tax depends on the relative size of the
supply and demand elasticities. It can be seen that OJ = 1 when.yv
x
= 0, that is, when the excess supply of exportables is perfectly
inelastic, their price falls by the amount of the tariff. The
incidence in this particular case falls totally on exporters. By
contrast, when the excess demand of importables is perfectly
inelastic (YM = 0 and, therefore, oo = 0) , the price of non-
tradeables, too, remains unaltered. In this case the tax is
shifted equally onto producers of exportables and home goods.- 6 -
However, if home goods are substitutes for both tradeables, the
tariff will increase the relative price of importables in terms
of home goods while the relative price of exportables declines in
terms of non-traded goods. Furthermore these price changes are
less than proportionate to the tariff. A graphical description of
the shifting principle is given in the Appendix.
3. The Quantitative Analysis; Implications of Non-Agricultural
Import Protection in Peru and Malaysia for Agricultural Pro-
tection
3.1 The Pattern of Non-Agricultural Import Protection in Peru
and Malaysia and the Differential Agricultural Export Per-
formance
The major difference between the Peruvian and the Malaysian trade
policy is that Peru stuck to import substitution over extended
periods whereas Malaysia did not. Since the end of the 1950's,
various Peruvian governments have emphasized industrial develop-
ment and granted generous import protection to the manufacturing
sector. The instruments of trade policy used are manifold and
2
partly compensate each other. Import protection for the manu-
facturing sector is based on import tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers to imports. Import tariffs vary widely across industries
[Hanel (1987)] and over time [Franklin/Valdes (1989]. In 1980,
nominal import tariffs on consumer goods were highest with 62.2%,
followed by import tariffs on construction material with 43.9%,
industrial inputs (33.7%), industrial capital goods (33.2%),
transport equipment (32.6%) and agricultural capital goods
(29.2%). The average import tariff was particularly high in the
1970's when the Peruvian economy was strongly insulated from
international markets. Non-tariff barriers to imports were cut
down in a liberalization phase between 1980 and 1984, but a re-
turn to restrictive trade and exchange rate policies has led to a
significant increase in non-tariff barriers since then. The per-
centage share of restricted and prohibited import categories has
risen strongly since 1985. The major instruments of non-tariff
protection are a comprehensive import licensing scheme and tech-- 7 -
nical and sanitary norms. Imports of the manufacturing sector are
further discriminated against by the multiple exchange rate
system compared, e.g., with food imports. The Peruvian government
uses various export promotion policies to offset unintended nega-
tive effects of import protection on exports. One important in-
strument, CERTEX, is supposed to increase non-traditional
exports. A more favourable exchange rate is allowed for these
exports as against traditional exports, especially agricultural
exports.
In Malaysia, up to the mid-1960"s industrial growth depended
mainly on unassisted import-substitution, for which high tariff
3
protection had not been necessary. The average nominal pro-
tection rate for manufactures in 1963 and 1965 was estimated at
4
11% and 13% [Power (1971)] and served mainly revenue purposes
[Teh (1977)]. But, since then, Malaysia's protection structure
has . undergone rapid changes. In an attempt to speed up in-
dustrialization import tariffs, import licensing, duty exemption
on essential inputs, drawbacks and refund of import duties and
surcharges were provided on a wide range of products, including
consumer goods, intermediates and capital equipment. The average
nominal tariff rate for manufacturing rose to 24.8% in 1969 and
34.1% in 1973 [World Bank (1980)]. As a result, import substi-
tution progressed rapidly, concentrating on non-durable and
durable consumer goods. In 1973, 90% of non-durable and 95% of
durable goods were produced domestically [Chee (1979)]. The
first, "easy" stage of import substitution was nearly completed,
and further expansion of import substitution became increasingly
limited. Although the overall level of tariffs on manufactures
was substantially higher in the 1970's than that in the 1960's,
the level in the latter half of the 1970's was not higher than
that in the early 1970's. Average nominal tariff rates were 29.4%
and 31.4% in 1975 and 1977 respectively. The protection system is
still in force, although the granting of tariff protection and
import restrictions has been substantially curtailed. To a large
extent, tariffs and quantity restrictions are applied on a case-
to-case basis to industries which are considered in a position to
supply the major portion of the domestic market, thus causing an
inherent firm and-trade bias in the protection system. In 1982,the nominal tariff on total manufactures was 32.4%, with the
tariffs on processed goods at 18.5%, construction materials 18.3%
and transport equipment 35.3%.
After having almost completed the first phase of import substi-
tution by the mid-1970's, export promotion was actively pursued.
A major element of the export promotion system was to encourage
the establishment of industries producing or assembling products
for export in a special geographical zone. These industries
operate in a free trade regime with minimal customs control and
formalities. Besides the free trade zones, licensed manufacturing
warehouses were allowed to be set up, enjoying similar facilities
to those under the free trade zones. Another element in the
export promotion strategy is the export refinancing scheme intro-
duced in 1977. In addition, other concessions, including duty
exemptions on imports of capital equipment or machinery and duty
drawbacks, were given to further encourage the development of
export-based manufacturing industries, although access to these
incentives is not automatic.
Various authors have argued that a favourable treatment of the
import-substituting manufacturing sector distorts the incentives
so that they operate against agricultural exportables. Table 1
presents a comparative picture of agricultural development in
Peru and Malaysia since the 1960 's. It shows that the agricul-
tural export sector performed far worse in Peru than in Malaysia.
In Peru, the self-sufficiency ratio declined and Peru became
increasingly dependent on food imports. Agricultural imports
accounted for a rising share of Peruvian import expenditures. On
the other hand, agricultural export earnings as a share of total
export earnings dropped by more than 50% between 1963 and 1986.
This implies that the contribution of agriculture to the trade
balance worsened. The net contribution of agriculture to the
trade balance was clearly positive in 1963, but in 1986 agri-
cultural import expenditures were higher than agricultural export
earnings by 181 mill.?. At the level of individual agricultural
export products, Table 1 shows how unsuccessful Peru was in world
agricultural markets. Although the market share of Peruvian
coffee increased somewhat, this was accompanied by a drastic loss- 9 -
Table 1: Indicators of Agricultural Sector Developnent in Peru and Malaysia
Indicators Magnitude
Peru Malaysia
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Source: World Bank (1988); FAO (a, 1988); Salazar/Velasquez/Malaga/Ganez-
Velasquez (1986); Ministry of Finance, Malaysia; own computations.- 10 -
of market shares in the markets of its former major export mar-
kets. The fishmeal market share in 1986 was less than a third of
its value in 1963. The cotton market share in 1986 was less than
40% of the market share in 1963.
Agricultural sector development in Malaysia was in two respects
similar to Peru: the contribution of the agricultural sector to
GDP diminished and the share of agricultural exports in total
exports declined. This can be expected, however, from theory, as
the role of the agricultural sector reduces in the course of
economic development. All other indicators of Table 1 show a
rather successful agricultural sector development in Malaysia.
The net contribution of agriculture to the trade balance became
increasingly positive over time. In the period 1963-86, the share
of agricultural imports in total import expenditures became
smaller in Malaysia. Beyond this, Malaysia realized remarkable
gains in market shares on its major agricultural export markets.
The market share in the world rubber market, which was already
substantial in 1963 (34.5%), increased further. The market share
in palm oil more than tripled between 1963 and 1986 and is now
higher than 60%. A strong increase in the market share took place
in cocoa, too, where Malaysia developed from a marginal exporter
in 1963 to an important supplier in the world market.
3.2. Empirical Results for Peru
The incidence of import protection in the manufactured sector for
agriculture will be quantified first for Peru. Sjaastad's inci-
dence parameter ID is measured for the period 1970-85. By use of
the methodology Garcia (1981) applied to Colombia, the function
In (PN/Px)t = c + a) In (PM/Px)t + ut (12)
is estimated for Peruvian aggregate exports, and the disaggre-
gated function







for three agricultural export sectors: coffee, fishmeal and
cotton, p (p ) is the price level of non-agricultural exports
(agricultural exports), and u. is the error term in the period t.
The basic models (12) and (13) which are often estimated in the
true protection literature [Greenaway/Milner (1986, 1987)] suf-
fered from significant positive autocorrelation. Theory suggests
that this is due to an omitted-variables problem. The basic
three-goods model which is used to derive the magnitude of the
incidence parameter assumes that the trade balance is in equili-
brium and that real income and the productive capacity of the
country are constant [Dornbusch (1974); Sjaastad (1981)]. Clear-
ly, these assumptions did not apply in Peru in the period under
consideration. Hence, a balance-of-trade variable (BT) and a
real-income variable (Y) are introduced additionally into the
basic model. The extended econometric model is then
In (PN/Px)t = c + a) In (PM/Px)t + axBTt + ot2lnYt + ufc (14)
for total Peruvian exports and







a2lnYt + ut (15)
for the individual agricultural export sectors.
Price data are taken from Velasquez/Malaga/Gomez-Velasquez (1986)
and are converted into a common currency, the Peruvian Inti, with
exchange rate data from the IMF's International Financial Sta-
tistics. Table 2 shows the results of the estimates on the basis
of models (14) and (15) and the data basis is revealed in Appen-
dix 1.
The following major results can be derived from Table 2:- 12 -
Table 2 - Incidence Effects of Import Protection on Exports and Agricultural Exports
in Peru, 1970-85 (Calculation of Sjaastad's Incidence Parameter w)
Independent
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values in parentheses are t-values, p is the regression coefficient of the Cochrane/
Orcutt procedure, R is the corrected coefficient of determination and F the F-value.
Source: Own computations. pN , pM, py and pya are taken from Appendix 1. PVMA ^
S con-
structed as a weighted export price index for copper, oil and zinc where the
respective export earnings shares in 1979 are used as weights. The sources of
the raw data are given in Appendix 1.Bibliofrhefe
des Instituts fur We-frw
- 13 -
1. The calculation of Sjaastad's incidence parameter u indicates
for Peruvian aggregate exports as well as for agricultural
exports that price-raising policies on the import side induce
a relatively strong taxation of the export sector. All the
calculated incidence parameters are high and range above 0.8.
They are statistically different from zero in all cases.
2. The point estimates of the incidence parameters can be inter-
preted as follows: an increase of the price ratio between
importables and exportables by 1%, e.g. due to an import tax
on manufactured products, raises the price ratio between non-
tradeables and exportables by 0.88%. If the price ratio be-
tween importables and coffee exports rises by 1%, the price
ratio between non-tradeables and coffee exports increases by
0.87%. The incidence parameters for fishmeal and cotton are of
the same order: 0.88 and 0.85 respectively. What do these high
parameters mean? They imply that import protection, e.g. for
manufactured products, is followed by a price increase for
non-tradeables which is nearly as large as the price rise for
importables. The price of exportables, however, remains un-
affected. Thus, the terms of trade worsen for export pro-
duction as opposed to the production of non-tradeables and
import substitutes. This implies that agricultural exports
experience strong negative effects from the Peruvian import-
. substitution strategy for manufactured goods.
3. The relative price between importables and exportables is the
most important explanatory variable of the relative price
between non-tradeables and exportables in Peru. This holds
true for total exports and agricultural exports. If beta
coefficients are calculated, e.g. for coffee, it is, at 0.66,
highest for the price ratio between importables and coffee
exports. This means that a 1 standard deviation change in this
explanatory variable causes a 0.66 standard deviation change
in the dependent variable. The beta coefficients of the other
explanatory variables are clearly lower in absolute terms,
with -0.40 for the income variable, 0.14 for the price ratio
between non-agricultural exportables and coffee exports, and
-0.10 for the balance-of-trade variable. The corresponding- 14 -
beta coefficient for the relative price between importables
and exportables is 0.83 for total exports, 0.94 for fishmeal
exports and 0.75 for cotton exports. This is in each case
higher than the beta coefficient of the other explanatory
variables.
4. The goodness of fit is satisfactory for all regression models
in Table 2. The corrected coefficients of determination are
higher than 0.8 in each case.
Various authors have stressed the importance of the specification
of the econometric true-protection model for the magnitude of the
incidence parameter [Meester (1986); Smeets (1989)]. Therefore,
extensive experiments were carried out with alternative specifi-
cations of explanatory variables and alternative models. The
export price index for non-agricultural goods was calculated with
different weights, explanatory variables of the basic model were
taken out or additional variables introduced, and we tested for
different lags. Table 3 shows some results which indicate how
specification is important for the computed incidence parameters.
It can be seen that the incidence parameters are fairly stable
across different model specifications. They are generally high
and range between 0.7 2 and 0.92 for total Peruvian exports. For
agricultural exports, they are in all specifications higher than
0.55 and lie around 0.9 or 1 in various models. Given the results
of the sensitivity analysis, it seems safe to conclude that total
exports and major agricultural export goods bear the major burden
of import protection in Peru. They are significantly more heavily
taxed than the non-tradeable sector. Import protection drives up
non-tradeable prices whereas the prices of exportables remain
basically unaffected.- 15 -
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^Values in parentheses,are t-values. For the definition of Sjaastad's incidence para-
meter ui, see text. - The basic model (Model 1) is the model shown in Table 2. All
models, except Model 7, were corrected for autocorrelation with the Cochrane/Orcutt
iteration procedure. Model 7 is estimated for the period 1973-85.
Source: Own computations with data presented in Appendix 1.- 16 -
3.3 Empirical Results for Malaysia
The methodology applied to Peru is now used to quantify the
incidence of import protection for Malaysia in the period
1960-85. The two functions (12) and (13) are estimated for aggre-
gate exports and for three main agricultural export sectors in
Malaysia. As the relevant income data in the period before 1970
were not available, the estimation is limited to the basic models
(12) and (13).
The series of price indices for importables and exportables are
taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and the
non-traded goods index is from Jenkins/Lai (1989) as well as the
Bank Negara Malaysia's Quarterly Economic Bulletin. The results
of the estimates of the basic models are shown in Table 4 and the
data basis appears in Appendix 2.
The major estimation results as indicated in Table 4 are as
follows:
1. The estimates of Sjaastad's incidence parameter w indicates
that import protection imposed substantial taxation on the
Malaysian export sector, similar to the case for Peru. The
calculated incidence parameters range from 0.67 to 0.91, with
the palm oil sector heavily burdened by import protection of
the manufactured sector.
2. As can be seen in Table 4, the point estimates of the inci-
dence parameters indicate that an increase of the price ratio
between importables and exportables raises the price ratio
between non-tradeables and exportables by 0.78%. The incidence
parameters vary among the export crop sectors. The incidence
parameter for the rubber sector is the lowest, with the price
ratio between non-tradeables and rubber exports rising by
0.68% if the price ratio between importables and rubber
exports increases by 1%. The results for palm oil, on the
other hand, indicate that the price ratio between non-
tradeables and palm oil exports increases even more strongly,
by 0.91%, due to a 1% increase in the price ratio between- 17 -
Table 4 - Incidence Effects of Import Protection on Exports and Agricultural



























































Values in parentheses are t-values, p is the regression coefficient of the
Cochrane/Orcutt procedure, R
2 is the corrected coefficient of determination
and F the F-value.
Source: Own computations with data presented in Appendix 2. The export price
index for tin was used as a proxy for- 18 -
importables and palm oil exports. Similarly, the incidence
parameter for cocoa is high at 0.79%. In general, the inci-
dence effects of commercial policy in Malaysia, such as a
tariff on imports, fall to a large degree on exportables, with
some agricultural export crops being more negatively affected
by the protection on the manufacturing sector. The imposition
of a tariff resulted in a price increase for non-tradeables
which is close to the price increase for importables. The
analysis suggests that the net effect of the policy inter-
vention in Malaysia is somewhat similar to the Peruvian case.
It would operate as an export tax and induce resources away
from the export sector to the import-substitution activities.
While the strategic objective of the Malaysian policy is on
export promotion, this would imply that the policies intro-
duced may not have the desired effect.
3. The statistical results are fairly good, with satisfactory
goodness of fit for the models regressed. The Cochrane/Orcutt
procedure was used to reduce the problem of autocorrelation.
The corrected R
2 exceeded 84% in all cases.
4. We experimented with alternative specifications of the
explanatory variables and the basic model. A balance-of-trade
variable was introduced, and a weighted average of the export
price index of tin and petroleum was used as a proxy for non-
agricultural goods. The income variable was also added, but
only covers the period 1970-85. A lagged income variable was
also introduced. The results are shown in Table 5. The results
indicate severe problems of multicollinearity when the income
variable is added and should be treated with caution. Except
for the models with the income variables, all others performed
satisfactorily. The R
2 values are high and the incidence para-
meters do not change significantly. The incidence parameters
for total Malaysian exports range around 0.78. For agri-
cultural exports the parameters lie above 0.6 7 in all cases,
which supports the contention that the Malaysian export sec-
tors bear the major burden of import protection.- 19 -
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Values in parentheses are t-values. - The basic model (Model 1) is the
model shown in Table 4. -
 c The models cover only the period 1970-85.
Source: Own computations with data sources as indicated in Table 4.- 20 -
3.4 A Comparison of Peru and Malaysia with Regard to Explicit,
Implicit and Total Taxation on Agriculture
The incidence parameters estimated for Peru and Malaysia indicate
the extent to which a one percent tariff distortion in the manu-
facturing sector is shifted on to producers of agricultural
exportables. When multiplied by the prevailing tariff rate for
manufactures, they provide an estimate of the implicit tax rate
on these agricultural products. However, implicit taxation con-
stitutes only one part of total output taxation. In order to
evaluate whether a particular agricultural activity is protected
or discriminated against, those measures which directly affect
agricultural output prices have to be taken into account. An
estimate of nominal taxation is provided by the negative of the
nominal rate of protection. It measures the tax/subsidy rate
which can be manipulated by government and therefore indicates
the intended or explicit taxation/subsidization of agricultural
products. Taken together, implicit taxes and explicit taxes or
subsidies indicate total or net taxation of agricultural output
(TTR). Formally, this implies:
TTI^ = NTI^ + to NPRj^ (16)
where NTR. is the negative nominal protection rate (NPR.) of a
particular agricultural export commodity, u is the incidence
parameter and NPR is the average import tariff on manufactures.
NTR. is positive if the commodity is nominally taxed; negative if
it is subsidized.
Hence, the total tax or subsidy rate is determined by
i) the magnitude of the import tariff,
ii) the size of the shifting parameter, and
iii) the extent of nominal protection.
The regression results of the basic models [Table 2 and 4]
suggest that the shifting of the tax burden is nearly the same in
Peru and Malaysia and differs only slightly across different
agricultural exportables. Thus, differentials in agricultural- 21 -
protection between both countries and between agricultural pro-
ducts within each country are mainly attributable to differential
import tariffs and nominal protection. This is confirmed by the
different tax rates reproduced in Table 6.
1. With the exception of the subsidization of cocoa in Malaysia
in 1982, both countries directly tax their main export crops.
The magnitude of the tax, however, is much higher in Peru than
in Malaysia. In Peru, farmgate prices for coffee and cotton
are on average 62% and 71% below border prices. By contrast,
direct taxation of agricultural exportables in Malaysia is
fairly moderate, ranging from 21% for rubber to 6% for palm
oil and 5% for cocoa. Moreover, export taxation for Malaysia's
main export crops decreased during the period of investi-
gation, whereas it remained nearly constant' at high levels in
o
Peru.
2. Import tariffs averaged about 43% in Peru between 1979 and
1985. Given the estimated average incidence parameters of
0.875 for coffee and 0.846 for cotton, the implicit taxes on
these commodities following from the average import tariff are
38% and 36% respectively. Thus, manufacturing protection
places an additional heavy burden on export crops. The total
export taxes falling on coffee and cotton producers are as
high as 100% for coffee and over 100% for cotton when the
implicit tax component is accounted for. Of the total tax
rates, around 40% can be traced back to indirect discrimi-
nation via protection of manufactured products.
3. In Malaysia, the average nominal protection rate for manu-
facturing is about 32% in the period 1979 to 1983. With
average incidence parameters of 0.676, 0.913 and 0.7 91 for
rubber, palm oil and cocoa respectively, the corresponding
implicit tax rates amount to 22%, 29% and 25%. Except for
rubber around 1980, indirect discrimination exceeds direct
discrimination brought about by export taxation. As can be
seen from Table 6, even in years where the apparent intent (as
judged by low or negative direct taxation) was not to dis-- 22 -
Table 6: Explicit, Implicit and Total Taxes on Main Agricultural Exports in





















































































































































Implicit taxes are calculated on the basis of the incidence parameters given
in Tables 2 and 4 by applying nominal protection rates (NPR) of 43% and 32%
for the Peruvian and Malaysian manufacturing sector respectively. The NPR for
Peru is computed as an unweighted average from data given in Banco Central de
Reserva del Peru (a). For Malaysia an unweighted average NPR is calculated
using data provided by Bank Negara Malaysia. - Information on nominal pro-
tection rates for fishmeal exports were not available. Explicit tax rates for
coffee and cotton are computed on the basis of FAO (a) and unpublished data on
production value and production of Grupo Analisis Politica Agricola [GAPA]
(1987). All underlying nominal protection coefficients are crude NPCs, i.e.
actual farmgate price divided by border price. -
 C NTRs for estate rubber,
smallholder rubber and palm oil are taken from Jenkins/Lai (1989); for cocoa,
NTRs for 1979 to 1982 are computed from the World Bank (1984). All underlying
protection coefficients are based on export parity prices by accounting for
port handling and internal marketing and transport margins. NTRs for cocoa for
the years 1983 and 1984 are crude estimates based on farmgate and border
prices given in Senftleben (1988). n.a. = not available.- 23 -
criminate against or even to protect commodities, the negative
impact of indirect protection was large enough to lead to
overall taxation. In spite of a subsidy of 9% for cocoa in
1982, the total tax rate was 16%. Similarly, palm oil carried
a tax burden of 32% and 31% in 1982 and 1983, instead of
explicit taxes of only 3% and 2%.
Summing up, the results show that direct and indirect taxation of
agricultural exports is important in Peru and Malaysia. The
degree of taxation is much higher in Peru due to a higher nominal
protection rate for the manufacturing sector and a higher nominal
discrimination against the agricultural export crops. Together
with high import tariffs for manufactures, the high incidence
parameters in Peru lead to high indirect taxes on Peru's main
agricultural exportables. This strengthens the negative impact
brought about by high direct taxation. In Malaysia, implicit
taxes exceed explicit taxes. Here, too, import tariffs are large-
ly shifted on producers of exportables, either because home goods
and importables are fairly close substitutes or because agri-
cultural exportables are fairly inelastic in supply.
4. Summary and Conclusions
It was the objective of this paper to elaborate the implications
of import protection in the non-agricultural sector for agricul-
tural exports in a comparative study of Peru and Malaysia. The
incidence effect of non-agricultural import protection on agri-
cultural exports was measured and the magnitude of direct and
indirect taxation was compared. The analysis was based on the
true protection approach. After a brief review of the concept and
the differential performance of the agricultural export, sectors
in both countries, the analysis provided the following major
results:
1. The empirical results obtained for Peru and Malaysia confirm
experiences gained in other studies on the subject. In parti-
cular, they underline the importance of macroeconomic reper-
cussions of commercial policy for the agricultural sector. The- 24 -
estimates of the incidence parameters indicate that the degree
of shifting the burden of commercial policies onto exports is
high in Peru as well as in Malaysia. The point estimates of
Sjaastad's u> are highly significant and range in all model
specifications above 0.5, in some cases even above 0.9. This
implies that the impact of a tariff on imports falls almost
entirely on producers of exportable agricultural products.
2. Similar incidence parameters do not mean, however, that the
taxation of the agricultural export sectors in Malaysia and
Peru is of a similar magnitude. The nominal protection rates
for the manufacturing sector and the agricultural export crops
matter, too. Peru, the country with a poorly performing agri-
cultural export sector, protected its manufacturing sector
much more strongly than Malaysia and taxed its agricultural
export crops more heavily than Malaysia. This implies that the
explicit and the implicit tax on agricultural export crops is
clearly higher in Peru than in Malaysia. It is remarkable that
this result was even found in the period 1979-85, which in-
cluded years of liberalization in Peru.
The analysis suggests that the more successful performance of
agricultural exports in Malaysia can be explained by the smaller
degree of direct and indirect taxation due to lower nominal
protection coefficients rather than by lower incidence para-
meters. Given the high and similar incidence parameters in Peru
and Malaysia, policy-makers have to focus on the modification of
the relevant nominal protection rates if they want to improve the
performance of their agricultural export sectors. This is
especially important for Peru, where agricultural export crops
have become less competitive in the world market. Nominal pro-
tection rates of manufactured goods would have to fall and those
for agricultural export crops would have to increase.- 25 -.
Notes
1 Of course, other concepts were also used in the literature to
analyze the intersectoral linkages of import protection. An-
other branch of the literature applied the concept of effec-
tive protection in a partial-equilibrium framework [e.g. Ber-
trand (1980) on Thailand; Cuddihy (1980) on Egypt; Gotsch/
Brown (1980) on Pakistan; Reca (1980) on Argentina; Bovet/
. Unnevehr (1981) on Togo], The advantages of the true
protection concept compared with a partial-equilibrium
application of effective protection are summarized in
Greenaway/ Milner (1987). Another approach comes from the
World Bank's project on "The Political Economy of Agricultural
Pricing Policies". The real-exchange rate effects of general
macroeconomic policies are calculated there and the price
effects of direct and indirect agricultural policies are com-
pared. For a comparative analysis of 18 countries, see Schiff
(1988) and Krueger/Schiff/Valdes (1988). Published country
studies include Avillez/Finan/Josling (1988), Greene/Roe
(1989) and Jansen (1988). Other studies on the role of macro-
economic policies for agricultural incentives are based on
computable general equilibrium models [e.g. Amranand/Grais
(1984) for Thailand, Michel/NoSl (1984) for the Ivory Coast
, and Wiebelt (1989) for Peninsular Malaysia].
2 For an overview of import protection in the manufactured
sector of Peru, see Hanel (1987) .
3 For an overview of the incentive system and policies for. the
manufacturing sector in Malaysia, see Hoffmann/Tan (1980).
4 Estimates are for Peninsular Malaysia only and are based on
domestic input-output coefficients as against free-trade
input-output coefficients.
Therefore, the t-values of the incidence parameters in Model 2
of Table 2 have to be regarded with some caution, even after
using the Cochrane/Orcutt procedure.
6 Nominal protection rates for fishmeal were not available.
7 Differences in direct taxation of estate and smallholder
rubber are attributable to research and replanting cesses
which are actual transfer payments by smallholders to the
future, and can be redeemed through adopting new technology,
and replanting.
8 See Herrmann (1989) and Jenkins/Lai (1989) for a description,
of the evolution of protection of export crops and food crops
in Peru and Malaysia since the 1960's.- 26 -
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Appendix: The Effects of Trade Taxes on Relative Prices
Figure 1 illustrates the shifting principle. The two rays through
the origin represent the relative prices between importables and
exportables in the free-trade (OT) and tariff-ridden (OT
1)
situation respectively. The three H-schedules correspond to the
three substitutability assumptions made above. For each case the
corresponding schedule represents alternative price ratios for
tradeables and home goods which clear the home goods market. It
is also the locus of price combinations along which trade equili-
bria are attained. Points below and to the left of the H-lines
are points of excess supply and trade deficits, points above and
to the right indicate excess demand and trade balance surplus.
The schedule H'(H") represents equilibria where P /P (P /P )
remains unaltered and P._/P.T(P../P.J decreases (increases) when a
X N M N
tariff is introduced. Thus, if the economy's situation is re-
presented by H
1 a tariff will be shifted totally onto exporters,
whereas along H
1
1 the tariff is equally shifted on to exporters
and producers of home goods. The intermediate case is represented
by equilibria along H. The schedule is negatively sloped, re-
flecting the assumption that home goods can be substituted for
both exportables and importables.
Figure 1: The Effects of Trade Taxes on Relative Prices
H"
T'- 31 -
For this latter case, assume that a tariff is introduced. The
imposition of the tariff initially raises the domestic relative
price of importables in terms of both exportables and home goods
by the amount of the tariff. The economy moves to point C. At
that point, however, there is an excess demand for non-tradeables
and a corresponding trade-balance surplus. To attain equilibrium,
non-tradeables have to appreciate both in terms of importables
and exportables. In Figure 1 such a real appreciation is
indicated by a move to the left along OT
1. The new equilibrium is
at point B. At that point, the price of exportables relative to
home goods has fallen whilst the price of importables relative to
home goods has increased. As can be seen from Figure 1, the
steeper the H-schedule the smaller the discrimination against
exporters. However, exporters will always be penalized by tariffs
because their price is fully determined on the world market and



















































































































































































































































All price series are expressed in Intis. The export price series were converted into Intis with exchange rate data from IMF (1987). The price of non-agricultural export-
ables, PVMI' ^ Tables 1 and 2 is calculated as a weighted price index for copper, oil and zinc. Export earnings for the three products frcm Salazar/Velasquez/Malaga/Gomez-
VelasquezTL986) , pp. 68-69 are used as weights. In the basic model of Table 2, the weights are the respective earnings shares in 1979: 0.4562 for copper, 0.4292 for oil and
0.1145 for zinc. - Data on p were only available for the period 1973-85. Data for 1970-72 were constructed by assuming that pM experienced the same percentage growth in the
period 1970-73 as wages and salaries in the private sector. Wage data are taken from Salazar/Velasquez/Malaga/Gomez-Velasquez (1986), p. 25. -
 c Data on f 1970 1972
p g p g
are derived frcm Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (1974) , p. 26.
pu
g
for 1970 to 1972
Source: Columns (1) , (2) and (4) to (9) : Calculated with data from Salazar/Velasquez/Malaga/Gcmez-Velasquez (1986); column (3): Calculated with data frcm IMF (1987); column








































































































































































































































































































































Source: Column (1) is taken from Jenkins/Lai (1989) except for 1984 and 1985 which is computed from basic data provided in Bank Negara Malaysia; column (2) to (10) are taken
from IMF (1987).